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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 3368-78
9 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support, NFAC

X1 FROM : [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Conventional Forces

SUBJECT : Further Comment on DCI Reaction to Report on
Warning and Crisis Management

1. In my view, the DCI asked for two specific responses in his comments on our paper: *"What I think is needed is a statement of what steps need to be accomplished in order to provide adequate warning, and what alternative ways are there to fulfill such steps?"* and *"...after outlining what steps are necessary to provide good warning, the report could describe how previous organizational arrangements have attempted to fulfill requirements."* He also points out that the material is all in the paper, but I believe this refers mainly to our explanations of previous organizational arrangements.

X1 2. [REDACTED] draft memorandum does not meet the requirement for a description of alternatives among which the DCI can choose. Proposals A and B are merely strawmen whose obvious flaws have been clearly set out in the draft. Nor do they identify the "steps" of the warning process, pointing out in particular where we are now well-served and where we are weak.

3. I recommend that we outline for the DCI the steps necessary to provide adequate warning. I have sketched these below, and they may serve as a means to respond to the DCI's request for a basis on which to decide how to staff the warning function.

4. Warning is a process dependent on:

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- collection
- reporting
- analytical recognition
- further analysis
- alerting.

Each element has its own subdisciplines and requirements, however, the foundation on which all rest is an identified set of indicators that focus them on the process of "warning."

- Collection is driven by the indicators.
- Reporting by a collector depends on whether the information collected meets established *indications criteria*.
- Recognition of the *warning value* of the information to an analyst will depend on his familiarity with the set of indicators.
- Analysis of the warning-relevance of a report will often depend on an accumulation of such reports, and on *retasking* collectors.
- Alerting depends on:
 - The accumulation of indications,
 - The warning-sensitivity of the analyst,
 - The warning-sensitivity of the chain of command,
 - The seriousness of the situation.

5. The critical elements of this process are readily identifiable.
 - a. The need for a set of indicators is of paramount importance.
 - b. The need for collection strategies tuned, in (often excruciating) detail, to this "set" is critical.
 - c. The need for sensitivity by collectors, reporters, and particularly analysts, to the *warning problem* is essential.
 - d. The capability to redirect/reallocate collection resources on a real-time basis is essential.
 - e. An authority sensitized to warning, and responsible for alerting, is crucial because, in the final analysis, if the alerting is not done, the process fails.

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6. All of this having been said (and coming as news to few in the intelligence business), the range of alternative organizational means for improving the process can be narrowed. For my own part, based primarily on extensive familiarity with the Korean and European theater warning problems, I believe there are alternative ways of structuring the warning support for the DCI. To provide an effective system, however, major decisions on the allocation of limited resources will be necessary.

a. To develop a set of indicators which are useful--on each critical area where warning has been identified as a problem--a serious and detailed effort to develop such a set must be made by people with expertise in that area.

-- Once developed, this set must be applied rigorously to each collection system to develop a responsive collection strategy.

-- Critical to this effort is the formal adoption of priorities and the location of an authority to modify and reallocate these priorities on a real-time basis in response to a warning situation.

-- Equally as important is the need for periodic analytical review of the set of indicators, the priorities for collection, and the usefulness of the collection strategy--i. e., an effective updating.

b. To engender "sensitivity" (in collectors, reporters, and analysts) to the warning problem and to the warning function requires a whole range of measures, formal and informal, and a drawing together of Intelligence Community personnel on a given problem. This demands a rather extensive and serious effort, over time, and the key element is the drawing together of people with expertise for the purpose of addressing the warning function from both the systematic and substantive points of view.

c. The final requirement for a warning system is to have someone in authority who is committed to the warning responsibility, unencumbered by the myriad other concerns of those at the uppermost levels of management. His own sensitivity to the problem will thus be assured, and in his capacity as the DCI's warning officer, he will proselytize the function, and be prepared to issue alerts identified clearly as to whatever degree of seriousness is warranted.

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7. While I have not gone into the detail that may be necessary, the above suggestion could be fleshed out to answer the DCI's request for alternatives. Clearly, this proposal indicates the need for our Senior Warning Officer/Ombudsman. It ignores a committee, but the necessity for such will become obvious in a short time. The other two major implications are:

a. SWS should be disbanded, but in its place, some entity or several *de facto* working groups (probably under NIO auspices) must come into being. But SWS cannot develop detailed sets of indicators, nor can it sensitize the community in its present form. The new arrangements are a vital element of the process and will eat up resources--particularly on the already strained Soviet, Middle East, and Korean accounts.

b. The NIOs will take on a newly defined responsibility that will have to be both formalized and flexible. Lines of command will be fuzzy without a specific charter establishing the Senior Warning Officer as the authority to whom the NIOs report on warning matters.

8. As to the other elements of the warning process, the recent creation of CTS completes the organizational requirements for the locus of specific functions. Clearly, the line analytical elements of NFAC and DIA have the organization and responsibility that must do the work of analysis. My only other caution would be that we must make clear that D/NFAC cannot serve as the Senior Warning Officer because he is already asked to be responsible for too many other functions.



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